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When an airport's preexisting landing schedule becomes inefficient mainly due to 
inclement weather, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States 
aims to create a new queue that does not waste airport landing slots, considering 
airlines' incentives. Although the incentive to report delays is satisfied by the 
compression algorithm currently used by the FAA, it fails to give airlines the 
incentive to report cancellations. This paper gives an alternative mechanism, called 
the truncation algorithm, that satisfies the two incentive conditions above. Further, 
we show that the truncation algorithm satisfies desirable properties such as non-
wastefulness and individual rationality. 
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When an airport’s preexisting landing schedule becomes inefficient mainly due to
inclement weather, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States
aims to create a new queue that does not waste airport landing slots,1 considering air-
lines’ incentives. To be specific, when the number of utilizable runways or visibility
is reduced by inclement weather, the FAA initiates a ground delay program, usually
hours in advance, which usually proceeds in two steps. First, the number of landing
slots at the affected airport is reduced. Second, considering further changes after the
first step, the FAA performs the reassignment step by exploiting an algorithm. This
paper focuses only on this reassignment step.2
Implementing the second step, the FAA should respect incentives in order to
efficiently and fairly reassign airport landing slots among flights. Schummer and
Vohra (2013) formalize two incentive conditions: the incentive to report delays, and
the incentive to report cancellations. They show that the former is satisfied both by
the compression algorithm (which has been used by the FAA since 1998) and by
their proposed alternative (the trade-cycle algorithm), but that the latter is satisfied by
neither of these two algorithms. Furthermore, they introduce the concept of the core
in this environment, and demonstrate that the trade-cycle algorithm always produces
an outcome in the core while the compression algorithm does not. However, it should
be noted that, in practice, all resources (slots) basically belong to the planner (the
FAA), not the airlines. Therefore, it is not natural to define and consider the concept
of the core which is usually discussed in the literature. Instead, it would be more
natural to weaken this condition to individual rationality.
From this perspective, the objective of the paper is to design an alternative mech-
anism that satisfies the two incentive conditions above, maintaining the desirable
properties of the compression algorithm such as non-wastefulness and individual ra-
tionality. We call this algorithm the truncation algorithm because it “truncates” the
waiting time, taking into account an initial slot ownership and landing schedule. To
understand our algorithm more extensively, we compare the algorithm with others.
For instance, the truncation algorithm does not always produce an outcome in the
core while the trade-cycle algorithm does, as mentioned above.
More intriguingly, the truncation algorithm is very similar to the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm introduced by Schummer and Abizada (2013), who actually ex-
1Landing slots (or airport slots) are rights assigned to an entity (airline) by government agency
(mainly, an airport), who allows the slot owner (airline) to have the right to schedule a take-
off or landing during a specific time period. Landing slots are typically allocated according to
guidelines set down by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which is available
at the IATA’s website: http://www.iata.org/policy/slots/Pages/slot-guidelines.aspx or (for download)
http://www.iata.org/policy/slots/Documents/wsg-5.pdf.
2For details on a ground delay program, I refer the reader to Ball, Hoffman, and Vossen (2002) and
Schummer and Vohra (2013).
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tend the well-known deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).
In fact, given exogenously a fixed profile of priority orders of slots, the deferred
acceptance algorithm also achieves the above two incentive conditions, satisfying
non-wastefulness and individual rationality. However, since a priority order is ex-
ogenously determined, the outcome of the algorithm depends on the names of the
airlines. In other words, their algorithm is not anonymous whereas the truncation
algorithm is anonymous.
This paper is placed between two bodies of literature: the game theoretic litera-
ture on matching, and the operations-oriented literature. First, our model can be seen
as a restricted form of the college admissions model of Gale and Shapley (1962) or
a generalization of the housing market model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). Since in
our model landing slots do not have preferences but airlines do, our model comple-
ments the school choice model of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) where students
(landing slots) have preferences whereas colleges (airlines) do not. Other related lit-
erature is that of operations and transportation. Vossen and Ball (2006a) suggest a
linear programming approach in order to minimize total airline costs. Vossen and Ball
(2006b) regard the compression algorithm as a process of barter exchange. Note that
in the operations literature the concept of incentives is not formalized as rigorously
as in the matching literature. Instead, the literature considers a range of optimization
problems. See Wambsganss (1997) for a historical perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section defining
landing schedules and algorithms. In Section 3, we introduce the truncation algo-
rithm, and explain how it works through some examples. In Section 4, we discuss
properties of the truncation algorithm, while Section 5 compares the algorithm with
others. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Let A be a finite set of airlines, whose elements are typically denoted by A,B ∈ A.
Each airline A ∈ A has its own finite set of flights FA. We regard FA as the set of
airline A’s flights that have not been canceled so far. We denote by F = ∪A∈AFA
the set of all airlines’ flights.
There is a finite ordered set of slots S = {1, 2, 3, ..., |S|}, whose generic elements
are denoted by s, t ∈ S. Since the slot labels have ordinal meanings, s < t for
s, t ∈ S implies that slot s is earlier than slot t. Note that in our model the number
of all slots considered always outnumbers the number of all flights considered (i.e.,
|F | < |S|), and that each flight requires the use of only one slot that cannot be shared.
We denote by ef ∈ S the earliest feasible arrival time of flight f ∈ F . Let e be
the list of earliest feasible arrival times of all flights in F . Clearly, each flight f ∈ F
must be assigned to a slot no earlier than its earliest feasible arrival time ef . In other
2
words, it is not feasible for flight f ∈ F to be assigned to slot j ∈ S with j < ef .
A landing schedule is a function Λ : F → S mapping flights to slots such that
(i) for any flight f ∈ F , Λ(f) ≥ ef (i.e., each flight is assigned to one of its feasible
slots), and (ii) for any two flights f, f ′ ∈ F , f 6= f ′ implies Λ(f) 6= Λ(f ′) (i.e.,
distinct flights are assigned to distinct slots).
Although a landing schedule implicitly indicates which airlines have ownership
of the slots occupied by flights, it does not specify the ownership of unoccupied
(vacant) slots. Thus, we introduce the concept of a slot ownership that completely
describes which airlines holds which slots. A slot ownership is a function Ω : S → A
which should satisfy the following condition: for any flight f ∈ F , if f ∈ FA for any
airline A ∈ A, then Ω(Λ(f)) = A.
An assignment is a pair of functions (Λ,Ω). We interpret (Λ0,Ω0) as an initial
assignment which could be inefficient owing to the location of unoccupied slots. A
problem to reassign airport landing slots is summarized by P = (S,A, (FA)A, e,Λ0,
Ω0). An algorithm ϕ takes a problem as input and generates a (new) landing schedule
as output (i.e., ϕ(P ) = Λ). In what follows, we assume that each airline has the right
to swap its own flights within its own slots.
We now turn our attention to airlines’ preferences. In our model, we assume
that an airline is made better off only if it moves at least one of its flights up in a
(new) landing schedule while it moves no others down. Formally, given two landing
schedules Λ and Λ′, we say that airline A ∈ A strictly prefers Λ to Λ′ if (i) for any
flight f ∈ FA, Λ(f) ≤ Λ′(f), and (ii) for at least one flight f ∈ FA, Λ(f) < Λ′(f). If
a landing schedule Λ′ adjusts Λ by simultaneously moving some of airlineA’s flights
to earlier slots but moving others later, we say that Λ′ is preference-incomparable
with Λ.
Finally, given the preference domain, we say that an algorithm is manipulable if
an airline, by misreporting the feasible arrival times of its flights, can achieve a (new)
landing schedule that it strictly prefers to the one achievable by honestly reporting
feasible arrival times.
3 The truncation algorithm
In this section we introduce the truncation algorithm, denoted by ϕT , and show that
(through example) it cannot be manipulated by delaying the cancellation announce-
ment.3 For a description of the truncation algorithm, see Figure 1.
The key idea behind the truncation algorithm is to shorten the waiting time of
each flight (measured by Λ(f) − s in Steps 2 and 3) while respecting an initial as-
signment (λ0,Ω0) (reflected in Steps 2 and 3 where a slot allocation highly depends
on which airline initially has the given slot and to which slot each flight is initially
3The next section provides the formal proof; see Theorem 2.
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Step 0 Initialize the current assignment as Λ = Λ0 and Ω = Ω0.
Step 1 If S = ∅, end the algorithm at the assignment (Λ,Ω). Otherwise pick
the earliest slot s ∈ S and declare it active.
Step 2 Let A denote the airline that owns s. Check whether airline A has a
flight f ∈ FA ⊂ F such that ef ≤ s. If so, denote by F ′A the set of such
flights, let f = argminf∈F ′A{Λ(f) − s}, denote by t its slot Λ(f), and
go to Step 4. Otherwise go to Step 3.
Step 3 Check whether any airline has a flight f ∈ F such that ef ≤ s. If so,
denote by F ′′A the set of such flights, let f = argminf∈F ′′A{Λ(f) − s},
denote by t its slot Λ(f), and go to Step 4. Otherwise remove slot s
from S, and return to Step 1.
Step 4 Move flight f from slot t to slot s: set Λ(f) = s and set Ω(s) equal to
the airline of flight f . Remove s, f from S, F , respectively, and return
to Step 1.
Figure 1: The truncation algorithm
assigned). In other words, the algorithm “truncates” the waiting time, taking into
account an initial slot ownership and landing schedule.
One of the notable distinctions from the compression algorithm4 currently used
by the FAA is that the truncation algorithm does not trade a slot that an airline owns
but cannot use to another airline in exchange for some other slot. In addition, new
assignments according to the truncation algorithm are determined in order from the
earliest slot to the latest, and do not change once determined in previous rounds. The
following example shows how the algorithm proceeds step by step.
EXAMPLE 1: The initial assignment (Λ0,Ω0) is described by the table below. The
first and second columns in the table list all slots and the airline who initially owns
each slot. For example, airline B initially has slots 1, 3, and 7 (i.e., Ω(1) = Ω(3) =
Ω(7) = B). The third column contains information as to which slot each flight is
initially assigned, which airline owns each flight, and those flights’ earliest feasible
arrival times. For instance, airline A has flight f4 whose earliest feasible arrival
time is 2 but is initially assigned to slot 4 (i.e., f4 ∈ FA, ef4 = 2, and Λ0(f4) = 4).
4See Schummer and Vohra (2013) for a description of the compression algorithm.
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In Step 1 of the truncation algorithm, slot 1 is first declared active. Since slot 1
initially belongs to airline B but flight f7 (the only flight airline B has) cannot be
assigned to it, flight f5 is assigned to slot 1 in Step 3 of the algorithm. Similarly,
flight f4 is assigned to slot 2, and slot 3 remains vacant. This process updates the
original assignment to the following table, where the last two columns show updated
information.
A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline f4 f7 f5 f6 Flight Airline
1 B f5 C
2 C f4 A





Next, since airline A owns slot 4 but has no remaining flights to be assigned, flights
f6 and f7 become candidates for slot 4. However, due to the fact that Λ(f6) − 4 <
Λ(f7) − 4, the algorithm allocates slot 4 to flight f6. Finally, f7 is assigned to
slot 5, and slots 6 and 7 remain vacant. Thus, the algorithm is completed with the
following assignment. Note that the outcome below coincides with the outcome that
the compression algorithm produces in this example.
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A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline f4 f7 f5 f6 Flight Airline
1 B f5 C
2 C f4 A
3 B Vacant B
4 A f6 C
5 C f7 B
6 C Vacant C
7 B Vacant B
Now we consider one type of manipulation: the destruction of vacant slots. Sup-
pose that an airline has flight f initially assigned to slot s, but that the airline has to
cancel flight f . Then we can ask whether the airline has an incentive to report the
cancellation or not. Clearly, the airline could make the slot useless by delaying the
report sufficiently long, which probably leads to inefficiency. Thus, one should check
whether an algorithm to reassign slots is vulnerable to this kind of manipulation. The
following example illustrates that the compression algorithm is vulnerable to the de-
struction of slots, but the truncation algorithm is not. In fact, the truncation algorithm
cannot be manipulated by delaying the cancellation announcement sufficiently long,
as shown in the next section.
EXAMPLE 1: (revisited) Suppose that airline B destroys slot 1 by delaying the
cancellation announcement. Then the initial assignment and the outcome of the trun-
cation algorithm can be summarized by the following table.
A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline f4 f7 f5 f6 Flight Airline
2 C f5 C
3 B f4 A
4 A f6 C
5 C f7 B
6 C Vacant C
7 B Vacant B
Note that airline B cannot be better off despite the destruction of slot 1 since its
flight is still assigned to slot 5. In fact, no airline can be better off by destroying
one of its own slots under the truncation algorithm. However, under the compression
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algorithm, airline B can make its flight f7 occupy slot 4 by delaying the cancella-
tion announcement, which demonstrates the fact that the compression algorithm is
vulnerable to the destruction of slots.
4 Properties of the truncation algorithm
If an algorithm to reassign landing slots has more desirable properties than others, it
would be reasonable to pick and adopt this algorithm instead of others. In our model,
desirable properties can be classified into three categories: efficiency, stability, and
incentive compatibility.
We first focus on the efficiency condition. Intuitively, we do not want to waste
slots when reassigning them among airlines. This notion can be formalized by re-
quiring an algorithm to produce a new landing schedule in which there is no flight
and no slot such that both (i) a flight can feasibly move up to a slot, and (ii) the slot
is vacant.
Definition An algorithm ϕ is non-wasteful if, for any problem P = (S,A, (FA)A, e,
Λ0,Ω0), there exists no flight f ∈ F and no slot s ∈ S such that both (i) ef ≤ s <
ϕf (P ), and (ii) ϕ−1(s) = ∅.
The stability condition is also significant. Before defining this concept formally,
however, it should be noted that in practice all slots basically belong to the planner
(the FAA), not the airlines, although we have already introduced a slot ownership as
if each airline really owns its slots. Thus, it is not natural to define and consider the
concept of the core which is usually discussed in the literature. Instead, we weaken
the stability condition to individual rationality.
Definition An algorithm ϕ is individually rational if, for any problem P = (S,A,
(FA)A, e,Λ0,Ω0), no airline strictly prefers Λ0 to ϕ(P ).
The proposition below shows that the truncation algorithm satisfies the (weak)
efficiency and (weak) stability conditions, as do most other reasonable algorithms.
Proposition 1 The truncation algorithmϕT is non-wasteful and individually rational.
Proof. Suppose that there exist flight f ∈ F and slot s ∈ S such that both ef ≤ s <
ϕTf (P ) and (ϕ
T )−1(s) = ∅, given problem P . For slot s to be vacant according to
the algorithm, it should be removed from S in Step 3. This clearly implies that there
is no flight f ∈ F such that ef ≤ s, leading to a contradiction.
It is straightforward to prove the remaining part of the proposition because the
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algorithm regards Λ0(f) for each flight f ∈ F as a lower bound that flight f could
be assigned to. In other words, each flight f is never assigned to slot s later than
Λ0(f) in the outcome of the algorithm. 
The following two theorems are the main result of the paper, regarding incentive
compatibility of the truncation algorithm. The first theorem states that, under the
truncation algorithm, an airline cannot gain by misreporting the feasible arrival times
of its flights. Note that the compression algorithm also cannot be manipulated in this
way, as demonstrated in Schummer and Vohra (2013).
Theorem 1 The truncation algorithm ϕT cannot be manipulated by misreporting the
feasible arrival times of its flights.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof for Theorem 1 in Schummer and Vohra
(2013). First we provide detailed proof for the case of misreporting a single flight’s
arrival time, after which we give a brief general argument for the case of misreporting
multiple flights.
Suppose that flight f is assigned to slot s by honestly reporting ef . Obviously
ef ≤ s, and thus, misreport e′f should belong to one of the following three cases:
(i) If e′f < ef ≤ s, then the only way that this misreport can change the outcome
of the algorithm is for flight f to be assigned to a slot earlier than ef , which
clearly makes the airline worse off.
(ii) If ef < e′f ≤ s, then, when e′f is reported, the outcome of the algorithm cannot
make the airline strictly better off, compared to when ef is reported. This is
because, when e′f is reported, flight f would miss the chance to move into an
earlier slot.
(iii) If ef ≤ s < e′f , then flight f would have to end up in a slot strictly later than
s, since the algorithm never places a flight in a slot earlier than its reported
earliest arrival time. This obviously makes its airline worse off.
Therefore, misreporting a single flight’s time either puts the flight in a later slot, or
does not affect the outcome. In either case, flight f ’s airline cannot reap any benefit
from this misreporting.
More generally, suppose that airline A’s flights actually have the earliest feasible
arrival times (ef )f∈FA , but the airline misreports them to be (e
′
f )f∈FA with e
′
f 6= ef
for at least one f ∈ FA. Then consider the first round of the algorithm where op-
eration would differ under the report of (e′f )f∈FA versus (ef )f∈FA . Note that the
difference must occur in Step 2 or Step 3, and that, thereby, some flight g ∈ FA
would be placed into a later slot according to the previous argument regarding the
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single case. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the other flights, airline A cannot
benefit from this misreporting. 
The second result shows that the truncation algorithm gives airlines an incentive
to honestly report their flights’ cancellations. This is significant in that the compres-
sion algorithm currently used by the FAA fails to give the incentive, as illustrated in
the previous example.
Theorem 2 The truncation algorithm ϕT cannot be manipulated by delaying the can-
cellation announcement.
Proof. First we note that delaying the cancellation announcement sufficiently long
can be interpreted as assigning a dummy flight into an unusable vacant slot in an
initial assignment. More formally, let fD be a dummy flight of airline A, and s
be an unusable vacant slot that belongs to A. Since efD = s, it always holds that
ϕTfD(P ) = s. Further, for all the slots earlier than s, the outcome of the algorithm
does not change even if airline A delays the cancellation announcement.
For the other slots later than s, the outcome of the algorithm could be altered.
However, airline A who delayed the cancellation announcement cannot gain from
this outcome because slot ownership is not affected by delaying the cancellation an-
nouncement, and Λ(f) − s never changes for all f ∈ F in Step 2 or Step 3. Rather,
airline A could be worse off since one of other flights could lose the chance to other-
wise use slot s. 
5 Comparison with other algorithms
There exist many other algorithms which could be used to reassign airport landing
slots. Although we discussed the properties of the truncation algorithm in the previ-
ous section, we can understand the algorithm more extensively by comparing it with
others. Thus, in this section, we briefly introduce two algorithms, and then compare
them to the truncation algorithm.
We first examine the trade-cycle algorithm5 introduced by Schummer and Vohra
(2013). They introduce this algorithm to guarantee a form of property rights, which
is formalized by the concept of the core. A landing schedule Λ is a core schedule
with respect to an initial assignment (Λ0,Ω0) if there is no other landing schedule Λ′
and set of airlines B ⊂ A such that (i) for all f ∈ ∪A∈BFA, Ω0(Λ′(f)) ∈ B, and
(ii) each airline A ∈ B strictly prefers Λ′ to Λ. As they demonstrate, the trade-cycle
algorithm satisfies this condition. However, the truncation algorithm can produce a
5See Schummer and Vohra (2013) for a description of the trade-cycle algorithm. Note that the
trade-cycle algorithm has the flavor of the top-trading cycle algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974).
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landing schedule that is not in the core, as illustrated in the following example bor-
rowed from Schummer and Vohra (2013).
EXAMPLE 2: Consider the following initial assignment and the outcome of the trun-
cation algorithm in the table.
A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline f5 f4 f3 Flight Airline
1 A f3 C
2 B f4 B
3 C f5 A
4 B Vacant B
5 A Vacant A
Note that the outcome of the truncation algorithm is not in the core because airlines
A and B, by using only their own slots among themselves, can achieve the schedule
in which they are each strictly better off (i.e., flights f4 and f5 can be assigned to
slots 1 and 2, respectively).
We now concentrate on the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm introduced by
Schummer and Abizada (2013). In fact, they provide the DA with self-optimization6
algorithm. However, whether any landing schedule is self-optimized or not is irrel-
evant when speaking of incentives in our model. Therefore, for a comparison with
the truncation algorithm, we consider the DA (without self-optimization) algorithm
described in Figure 2.7 Note that, compared with the DA with self-optimization algo-
rithm, the DA algorithm has only one adjustment: the omission of a self-optimization
step.
Although the DA algorithm looks very different from the truncation algorithm,
they are the same under certain circumstances. To be specific, if priority orders are
determined endogenously by some function of parameters in the model, two algo-
rithms could produce the same outcome. We give an example illustrating the relation
between them.
EXAMPLE 1: (revisited) Consider the following initial assignment with the profile of
priority orders. The last two columns show the outcome of the truncation algorithm.
6For the notion of self-optimization, see Schummer and Abizada (2013).
7For the DA algorithm’s description, we need the following definitions. LetP(A) denote the domain
of problems in which A is the existing set of airlines. For any positive integer s ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S|}, a
priority order (on A), s, is simply a linear order over the airlines A. For P ∈ P(A), (s)s∈S is a
profile of priority orders. Note that a priority order is exogenously given in the DA algorithm, as shown
in Figure 2.
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For a set of airlines A and a profile of priorities (s)s∈S on A, the
deferred acceptance algorithm with respect to (s)s∈S associates with
each P ∈ P(A) the landing schedule computed with the following
steps:
Step 0 For each s ∈ S, let ′s be the priority order over A that satisfies (i) if
Ω0(s) = A, then A is ranked first in ′s, and (ii) for any two airlines B
and C such that Ω0(s) 6= B and Ω0(s) 6= C, B ′s C is equivalent to
B s C.
Step 1 Assign slot 1 to some flight f ∈ FA such that A is the highest-ranked
airline in ′1 that can feasibly use slot 1. Remove f from F . If no such
flight exists, slot 1 permanently remains vacant.
Step 2 Assign slot 2 to some flight g ∈ FB such that, subject to the removal
of f , B is the highest-ranked airline in ′2 that can feasibly use slot 2.
Remove g from F . If no such flight exists, slot 2 remains vacant.
Step k Continue such assigning to each slot k = 3, 4, · · · , until all flights are
allocated.
Figure 2: The deferred acceptance algorithm
A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline Priority order f4 f7 f5 f6 Flight Airline
1 B A 1 B 1 C f5 C
2 C B 2 C 2 A f4 A
3 B B 3 A 3 C Vacant B
4 A C 4 A 4 B f6 C
5 C B 5 C 5 A f7 B
6 C C 6 A 6 B Vacant C
7 B A 7 B 7 C Vacant B
Note that the DA algorithm, in this example, produces the same schedule. However,
if priority order 4 changes into A 4 B 4 C, then the DA algorithm will produce
a different schedule: flights f6 and f7 are assigned to slots 5 and 4, respectively.
Meanwhile, we rename airlines A to B, B to C, and C to A. The following table
summarizes the result of this permutation. It can be easily checked that the landing
schedule does not change according to the truncation algorithm while it does change
according to the DA algorithm.
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A B C (Λ,Ω)
Slot Airline Priority order f5 f6 f4 f7 Flight Airline
1 C A 1 B 1 C f5 A
2 A B 2 C 2 A f4 B
3 C B 3 A 3 C Vacant C
4 B C 4 A 4 B f6 A
5 A B 5 C 5 A f7 C
6 A C 6 A 6 B Vacant A
7 C A 7 B 7 C Vacant C
The last example above motivates us to consider the anonymity property. Let π
be a bijection of A into itself denoting permutations of A. Given any permutation
π, let Fπ(A) denote a set of flights that airline π(A) ∈ A has, and πΩ(s) denote the
airline that each s ∈ S belongs to under the permutation. In addition, we define πP
as follows: for any permutation π, πP := (S,A, (Fπ(A))A, e,Λ0, πΩ0). Note that
πP does not affect a profile of priority orders (s)s∈S , which plays a critical role in
differentiating the truncation algorithm from the DA algorithm.
Definition An algorithm ϕ is anonymous if, for any problem P = (S,A, (FA)A, e,
Λ0,Ω0) and any permutation π, it holds that ϕ(P ) = ϕ(πP ).
Anonymity requires that an algorithm should not depend on the names of the
airlines. Admittedly, this condition might not be significant in practice. However,
by requiring anonymity, we can demand that a priority order should be determined
endogenously, not exogenously, and thereby we can differentiate the truncation algo-
rithm from the DA algorithm.
Proposition 2 The truncation algorithm ϕT is anonymous.
Proof. We first note that permutation π does not affect S and Λ0, which implies that
each value of Λ(f)− s in Steps 2 and 3 would not change under π. Thus, even after
the permutation, each flight f ∈ F is also (according to ϕT ) assigned slot s, to which
f has been already assigned under problem P . The name of the airline who owns
f and s, of course, may change. However, since ϕT (πP ) is a landing schedule that
does not specify the ownership of slots, we can obtain the desired result. 
Finally, the table below summarizes the properties of each algorithm. One can
easily check that the truncation algorithm satisfies all the properties except for the
core condition.
12
Property Compression Truncation Trade-cycle DA
Non-wastefulness ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Individual rationality ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Incentive to report delays ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Incentive to report cancellations × ◦ × ◦
Outcome in the core × × ◦ ×
Anonymity ◦ ◦ ◦ ×
6 Concluding remarks
To reassign airport landing slots more efficiently and fairly, we have introduced the
truncation algorithm which is non-wasteful and individually rational, and proved that
the algorithm gives airlines the incentives to report both delays and cancellations.
Although the truncation algorithm does not always produce an outcome in the core,
it satisfies anonymity.
Schummer and Abizada (2013) extends the model of Schummer and Vohra (2013)
by explicitly considering the airlines’ preferences. One of the remaining tasks is to
check whether the truncation algorithm can be applied to the model considering the
airlines’ preferences explicitly. Another remaining task is to characterize the trunca-
tion algorithm, based on (i) individually rational monotonicity, which requires that,
when an airline claims a subset of the set of its own slots, all airlines be weakly better
off, (ii) population monotonicity, which requires that, when a new airline shows up
to share the slots in the airport, all airlines be weakly worse off, or (iii) consistency,
which requires that, when some airlines leave the airport with the assigned slots, the
assignment of the other slots among the other airlines be consistent.8 We leave these
issues for future research.
8For the formal definitions of individually rational monotonicity, population monotonicity, and con-
sistency, see Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kesten (2006).
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  기상상황의 악화로 인하여 공항에서의 기존 착륙 일정이 비효율적으로 
변할 경우 미국의 연방항공국(the Federal Aviation Administration)은 
항공사들의 유인(incentive) 문제를 고려하는 가운데 공항의 착륙 
슬롯(landing slot)이 낭비되지 않도록 착륙 일정을 재조정한다. 현재 
미연방항공국은 공항에서의 착륙 일정 재조정을 위하여 항공사들에게 
항공기의 지연을 공항에 정직하게 보고할 유인을 제공하는 압축 
알고리즘(the compression algorithm)을 사용하고 있다. 그러나 압축 
알고리즘의 경우 항공사들에게 항공기의 취소를 공항에 정직하게 보고할 
유인을 제공하지 못한다는 문제점을 지니고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 
항공사들에게 항공기의 지연 및 취소를 공항에 정직하게 보고할 유인을 
모두 제공하는 절단 알고리즘(the truncation algorithm)을 새롭게 
제시한다. 나아가 절단 알고리즘이 공항의 착륙 슬롯을 낭비하지 
않음(non-wastefulness)은 물론 개별적 합리성(individual rationality)의 
조건 역시 충족시킴을 보인다. 
 
주요어: 유인(incentive), 알고리즘(algorithm), 공항(airport) 
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